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 26 
Structured synopsis 27 
Objectives 28 
Unnecessary antibiotic prescribing contributes to antimicrobial resistance. A randomized 29 
controlled trial in 2014-5 showed that a letter from England’s Chief Medical Officer (CMO) 30 
to high prescribing General Practitioners (GPs), giving feedback about their prescribing 31 
relative to the norm, decreased antibiotic prescribing. The CMO sent further feedback letters 32 
in succeeding years. We evaluate the effectiveness of the repeated feedback intervention. 33 
Methods 34 
Publicly available databases were used to identify GP practices whose antibiotic prescribing 35 
was in the top 20% nationally (the intervention group). In April 2017, GPs in every practice 36 
in the intervention group (n = 1,439) were sent a letter from the CMO. The letter stated that, 37 
“the great majority of practices in England prescribe fewer antibiotics per head than yours”. 38 
Practices in the control group received no communication (n = 5,986). We used a Regression 39 
Discontinuity Design to evaluate the intervention because assignment to the intervention 40 
condition was exogenous, depending on a ‘rating variable’. The outcome measure was the 41 
average rate of antibiotic items dispensed from April 2017 to September 2017. 42 
Results 43 
The GP practices who received the letter changed their prescribing rates by -3.69% [95% CI 44 
= -2.29, -5.10]; p < 0.001, representing an estimated 124,952 fewer antibiotic items 45 
dispensed. The effect is robust to different specifications of the model. 46 
Conclusions 47 
Social-norm feedback from a high-profile messenger continues to be effective when repeated. 48 
It can substantially reduce antibiotic prescribing at low cost and at national scale. Therefore, 49 















Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a growing public health threat.1 It is estimated that 65 
700,000 people die of resistant infections every year and that this number could rise to 10 66 
million lives a year by 2050, with common procedures, such as surgery and chemotherapy, 67 
becoming too dangerous to perform.2 One cause of the problem is poor antimicrobial 68 
stewardship, with large quantities of antibiotics being prescribed to patients who do not need 69 
them.2, 3 70 
 71 
In the UK, about 80% of antibiotics are prescribed in primary care.4 There is significant 72 
variation in prescribing between General Practitioner (GP) practices, which cannot be 73 
explained by practice demographics, indicating that many unnecessary antibiotics are being 74 
prescribed in primary care.5-7 As a part of its AMR stewardship strategy, the UK Government 75 
aims to eventually give all health and care providers feedback in a format that is useable and 76 
relevant to support good practice.8 77 
 78 
Giving GPs feedback on their practice’s performance compared to other practices can 79 
decrease prescribing.9 In September 2014, we ran a randomised controlled trial (RCT) in 80 
which the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) sent a feedback letter to 3,227 GPs stating that their 81 
practice was prescribing antibiotics at a higher rate than 80% of practices in its local area. As 82 
well as the social norm information, the letter presented three specific, feasible actions that 83 
the recipient could take to reduce unnecessary prescriptions of antibiotics: giving patients 84 
advice on self-care, offering a delayed prescription, and talking about the issue with other 85 
prescribers in his or her practice. The letter was accompanied by a copy of the “Treating your 86 
infection” leaflet (a part of the TARGET Antibiotic Toolkit),10 which aims to facilitate 87 
communication between prescriber and patient, and increase the patient’s confidence to self-88 
care. Between October 2014 and March 2015, the practices in the intervention group 89 
dispensed 3.3% fewer antibiotic items relative to the control group. The rate of dispensing 90 
antibiotics differed significantly in every month in the study period, with no evidence of a 91 
trend. Therefore, the feedback letter was sent to the control group at the beginning of April 92 
2015.  93 
 94 
The rise in AMR is an issue of international concern,1, 2 so the trial had an international 95 
impact. The intervention has already been adopted by CMOs in Australia,11 Northern 96 
Ireland,12 and Canada,13, 14 and France is planning to follow suit.15 97 
 98 
Following on from the success of the RCT, the CMO for England has sent annual feedback 99 
letters to GPs whose practices are in the top 20% of prescribers, each winter flu season. 100 
However, there is a question of whether a repeated feedback intervention continues to be 101 
effective.16 Because the CMO’s feedback was targeted at a specific segment of 102 
practitioners—the top 20%—it is possible to use a regression discontinuity design to evaluate 103 




Intervention: Letters to High Antibiotic Prescribers 108 
The CMO sent her feedback letter on antibiotic prescribing rates to GPs in April 2017. The 109 
feedback letters were sent to 6,318 individual GPs in 1,439 different GP practices with high 110 
antibiotic prescribing rates. Practices were allocated to the intervention arm if they were in 111 
the top 20% of prescribers for the twelve months prior to the end of the intervention (Oct 112 
2015 –Sep 2016), as judged using a prescribing indicator which divides Antibacterial Items 113 
by STAR-PU (Specific Therapeutic group Age-sex Related Prescribing Units) weightings. 114 
This means that the prescribing rate is adjusted to take into account some of the 115 
demographics of the GP practice.  116 
 117 
The letters differed slightly from the 2014 trial:9 NHS Local Areas no longer exist, so each 118 
practice’s prescribing was compared to that of practices in England; and additional guidance 119 
was presented in a box on the right-hand side, instead of in the middle of the letter. There 120 
were six different letters (Supplementary Data: Figures S1-S6). The letters were tailored 121 
according to GP practice prescribing rate, change in prescribing over time, and whether they 122 
were previously sent feedback. Specifically, the top 11-20% practices with increasing 123 
prescribing rates were told ‘The great majority (80%) of practices in England prescribe fewer 124 
antibiotics per head than yours. Most other practices have reduced their prescribing rates 125 
since 2013/14 but yours has increased’ (Letter 1: Figures S1-S2); the rest of the top 20% were 126 
simply told ‘The great majority (80%) of practices in England prescribe fewer antibiotics per 127 
head than yours’ (Letter 2: Figures S3-S4). Finally, the top 10% of practices were told ‘The 128 
great majority (90%) of practices in England prescribe fewer antibiotics per head than yours’ 129 
(Letter 3: Figures S5-S6). When a practice had received a previous letter, the CMO noted, ‘I 130 
have written to your practice previously’, so there were two variants of each letter, A and B. 131 
Table 1 shows the key differences between the letter variants. As in the 2014 trial, the letter 132 
was accompanied by a copy of the TARGET “Treating your infection” leaflet 133 
(Supplementary Data: Figure S7). 134 
 135 
Regression Discontinuity Design 136 
We decided to use Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to analyse the effects of our 137 
intervention instead of more conventional analytical approaches, such as interrupted time 138 
series (ITS) and difference-in-difference design. RDD is a standard approach for evaluating 139 
interventions.17 In an RDD, the assignment of participants to the intervention versus the 140 
control condition is exogenous, depending on whether a numerical ‘rating variable’ falls 141 
above or below a certain threshold. Participants scoring above the threshold are assigned to 142 
one group, such as the treatment, whereas those scoring below the threshold are assigned to 143 
another group, for example, the control. The assumption behind RDD is that, in a window 144 
around the threshold (the ‘bandwidth’), observations on each side are on average identical in 145 
terms of all pre-treatment variables. There is a ‘local randomization’ in this window. There is 146 
also a discontinuity in the probability of treatment at the threshold between the treatment 147 
group and the control. Therefore, if there is a corresponding discontinuity in the intercept of 148 
the regression of the outcome variable on the predictor at the threshold level, the change in 149 
outcome is attributed to the effect of the intervention.18 Critically, RDD can provide evidence 150 
for the causal effect of an intervention because, controlling for the value of the rating 151 
variable, it is possible to account for unobserved differences between the treatment and the 152 
control group.19-21 153 
 154 
RDD a quasi-experimental evaluation method that can be used in cases where it would be 155 
impractical or unethical to assign participants to different groups,17 for example, the impact 156 
of prisons on recidivism, and the impact of health insurance on improving service 157 
utilisation.22, 23 In the present study, it is unethical to experimentally assign GP practices to 158 
different experimental groups since we have reason to believe that the treatment is effective, 159 
given the evidence from our previous trial.9 Therefore we evaluate the intervention using a 160 
sharp RDD, a variation of the RDD where the rating variable perfectly predicts treatment 161 
allocation.24 This means that the probability of treatment changes from 0 to 1 at the threshold. 162 
The rating variable was the prescribing indicator (average antibiotic prescribing rate adjusted 163 
for STAR-PU) and the threshold was 1.14825 antibiotic items dispensed per STAR-PU, the 164 
cut-off point separating the 20% of highest prescribers from the remaining GP practices. We 165 
used R,25 specifically function call RDestimate of package rdd,26 to build our RDD models. 166 
 167 
Bandwidth Size 168 
One of the critical steps in RDD is selecting the bandwidth size around the threshold to create 169 
the localised sample.27 This is because narrower bandwidths increase comparability between 170 
cases on each side of the threshold while decreasing the statistical power, whereas wider 171 
bandwidths increase power at the cost of decreasing internal validity by including cases 172 
further away from the threshold. Hence it is necessary to select the appropriate bandwidth, 173 
which finds the balance between precision and power. The Imbens-Kalyanaraman algorithm 174 
provides a data driven, asymptotically optimal bandwidth for RDD.27 The calculated 175 
bandwidth is tailored to specific features of the RDD setting. Using package rdd,26 in R,25 we 176 
calculated the optimal bandwidth size to create the localised sample around the threshold that 177 
minimised bias and optimised precision. The optimal bandwidth differed for different models 178 
considered. For the most parsimonious model (Table 2) the optimal bandwidth was 0.5234 179 
antibiotic items dispensed per STAR-PU. Thus, practices within 0.5234 points of the 180 
threshold in either direction were included in the local linear regression analyses. The number 181 
of practices within this bandwidth (n = 6,524), used to calculate the most plausible estimate 182 
of the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), provided sufficient power to detect a 183 
statistically significant effect at p < 0.001. 184 
 185 
Data 186 
The data for this study came from the Public Health England data warehouse (originally 187 
collected by the NHS Business Services Authority and NHS Digital).28, 29 These data consist 188 
of all GP practices in England who were sent the April 2017 CMO feedback letter (n = 189 
1,439), as well as the remaining practices who served as the control group (n = 5,986). To 190 
account for differences in prescribing due to seasonality, we defined our baseline measure, 191 
which we used to determine the percentile of prescribers that each practice was in, as mean-192 
STAR-PU-adjusted prescribing rate from October 2015 to September 2016. The outcome 193 
measure was mean-STAR-PU-adjusted rate of antibiotic items dispensed during the 194 
intervention period, April 2017 to September 2017.  195 
 196 
Data Preparation 197 
We calculated our baseline and outcome measures using the same quarterly Antibacterial 198 
Items/STAR-PU weightings that we used to select the practices for letter allocations. For the 199 
analysis we coded all the practices that received the letter (20% of highest prescribers) as the 200 
intervention group. The remaining practices, which did not receive the letter because they 201 
were in the 21 – 100% of prescribers, were the control group. 202 
 203 
We kept the GP practices in the central 99% of the records of both baseline and outcome 204 
measures. This means that we removed practices that were classified as outliers due to their 205 
extremely high or low rates of prescribing (n = 133), or due to extremely large/small patient 206 
populations (n = 57). We also removed practices due to instances of missing prescribing data 207 
between October 2015 to September 2017 (n = 231).  208 
 209 
Since the CMO letters were sent only to the highest 20% of prescribers, we aimed to set the 210 
RDD cut-off threshold at the 5th quintile. However, the threshold was adjusted to 1.1812 211 
from 1.1813 to account for the removal of some practices (n = 9) during data preparation 212 
because of practice changes over the intervention period or because of lack of STAR-PU data 213 
for the duration of the intervention period. Overall, we removed 430 GP practices. This 214 
resulted in the total sample of 6,995 GP practices, 1,378 of which received the letter in April 215 
2017 (treatment group), and 5,617 of which did not (control group). 216 
 217 
Results 218 
Table 2 and Figure 1 demonstrate the results of the simplest model, where the baseline 219 
measure (average prescribing rate adjusted for STAR-PU during the period October 2015 to 220 
September 2016) is regressed on the outcome measure (average prescribing rate adjusted for 221 
STAR-PU during the six month of the intervention period). The RDD estimates can be 222 
interpreted as weighted average effects of treatment across all GP practices. The LATE 223 
estimate, which is calculated using the optimal bandwidth, shows that the letter intervention 224 
resulted in a significant discontinuity (β = -0.016, SE = 0.003, z = -5.141, p < 0.001); the GP 225 
practices who received the letter changed their prescribing rates by approximately -3.69% 226 
[95% CI = -2.29, -5.10]. However, it is important to acknowledge that deprivation levels 227 
could vary between the local areas covered by GP practices in the treatment and the control 228 
groups. This variation could affect prescribing rates of GP practices. Thus, we adjusted the 229 
estimates for this potential variation in deprivation using deprivation indices.30 We found that 230 
the intervention effect was not sensitive to the inclusion of a deprivation measure (Table 3). 231 
Moreover, although the effect size varies depending on the bandwidth used, overall the effect 232 
remains robust to halving or doubling the bandwidth and therefore including a different 233 
number of observations for both the unadjusted and adjusted estimates. This indicates that our 234 
findings are likely to be relatively reliable and valid. 235 
 236 
We also built an RDD with a categorical variable specifying GP practices’ allocation to one 237 
of six letters or the control group, to examine whether the intervention was effective across 238 
all letter types. We present the estimates for each letter type, both unadjusted and adjusted for 239 
deprivation, in (Table 4). The four letters sent to the top 11-20% (Letters 1A, 1B, 2A, and 240 
2B) were estimated to be relatively effective at reducing antibiotic prescribing  (1A: -5.21% 241 
[95% CI = -1.98, -8.45]; 1B: -4.75% [95% CI = -2.96, -6.54]; 2A: -2.32% [95% CI = -0.45, -242 
4.18]; 2B: -3.81% [95% CI = -1.86, -5.76]), with the letters sent to those practices whose 243 
prescribing was increasing being most effective. However, for the practices in the top 10% 244 
(Letters 3A and 3B) our estimates of the intervention in the general population were not clear. 245 
This is because the effects of the intervention for the two letter types were not statistically 246 
significant (3A: -2.13% [95% CI = 0.76, -5.02]; 3B: 1.47% [95% CI = 7.24, -4.30]). 247 
 248 
Based on a predicted 3.69% reduction in antibiotic prescribing for the intervention group over 249 
a six-month period (Table 2), an estimated 124,952 fewer antibiotic items were dispensed 250 
during the study as a result of the letter intervention. Specifically, we estimated that 251 
3,386,243 antibiotic items would have been dispensed without the intervention by the GP 252 
practices in the intervention arm, whereas 3,261,291 antibiotic items were found to have been 253 
dispensed with the intervention. 254 
 255 
To estimate the effect on direct prescribing costs for the public sector, we considered the 256 
basic cost of a drug as used in primary care during the intervention period, specifically the 257 
average net ingredient cost (NIC) of £8.29 per antibiotic item.31 The NIC does not take into 258 
account dispensing costs, fees or prescription charge income. Thus, we assumed that 10.2% 259 
of antibiotics (12,745) incurred a £8.60 prescription charge (in line with the overall 260 
exemption rate for April to September 2017), which we deducted from the cost estimate.31-33 261 
We also added the £1.25 per item professional fee payable to pharmacy contractors by NHS 262 
England in 2017.32, 33 The cost of printing and mailing to 6,318 GPs in 1,439 practices, which 263 
was deducted from the savings estimate to produce a net savings estimate, was £5,527. This 264 
equates to £0.04 per prescription prevented during the study period. Overall, the predicted 265 
reduction in the number of prescribed antibiotics during the intervention is estimated to have 266 
generated net savings of £1,076,908 (£991,842 if adjusted for practice deprivation) in NIC 267 
and dispensing costs for the public sector. 268 
 269 
Discussion 270 
RDD analysis shows that the 2017 CMO feedback letter reduced antibiotic prescribing by 271 
3.69%, which is similar to the 3.3% reduction in prescribing that was found in the 2014 272 
RCT.9 The finding that repeated feedback continues to have an effect on antibiotic 273 
prescribing is consistent with other trials that have used repeated feedback, in medicine and 274 
in other policy areas.34, 35 A systematic review finds that repeated feedback is more effective 275 
than single instances in healthcare settings.36 However, these studies tend to analyse the 276 
repeated feedback as a single intervention. To our knowledge, this is the first study that 277 
investigates whether a successful antibiotic feedback intervention can be as effective when 278 
repeated. Our results suggest that the social-norm feedback intervention can be successfully 279 
implemented multiple times.  280 
 281 
There were many anti-microbial stewardship interventions happening in the UK in 2017-8. 282 
For instance, the Quality Premium gave financial incentives for reducing inappropriate 283 
prescribing; the TARGET toolkit was developed, a suite of resources that health-care workers 284 
can use to support patients to self-care; the Antibiotic Guardian campaign encouraged 285 
professionals to pledge to prescribe appropriately; and the Keep Antibiotic Working 286 
campaign was a patient facing advertising campaign.37 Therefore, it may not be a surprise 287 
that antibiotic prescribing in primary care is decreasing.37 However, the RDD is a quasi-288 
experimental method of evaluation and the difference between the groups within the 289 
bandwidth is whether or not they received a letter, so we can attribute the 3.69% difference in 290 
prescribing between groups to the letter. 291 
 292 
The intervention decreased prescribing amongst practices in the top 11-20%, especially those 293 
whose prescribing had been increasing in the year beforehand; this decrease was observed 294 
both in practices that had received a letter in the previous year and in practices that had not 295 
received a letter. However, it did not have a significant effect on practices in the top 10%. 296 
There are two types of possible explanation for this difference. First, there may have been 297 
something specific to the practices in the top 10%. Our adjustments accounted for the age and 298 
sex of the practices’ patient population (STAR-PU) and their deprivation. However, there 299 
may have been other relevant factors that affect antibiotic prescribing, for instance prevalence 300 
of Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder or smoking, which were not captured in our 301 
models. Second, there may have been something about the message, which was more extreme 302 
for the top 10%. Telling GPs that their practice was in the top 10% of prescribers may have 303 
made their prescribing seem so disproportionate that they felt they could not do anything 304 
about it. The forceful message may have provoked psychological reactance, leading to 305 
negative attitudes towards the message and the generation of counterarguments, resulting in a 306 
lower behavioural intention to comply with the message.38-40 Alternatively, while highly 307 
credible sources are more persuasive the more discrepant the receiver finds the message, 308 
moderately credible sources may be less persuasive when they send a highly discrepant 309 
message. If the CMO is only perceived as a moderately credible source, then the highly 310 
discrepant message received by the top 10% of prescribers may have been less persuasive 311 
than the less discrepant message received by the top 20%.41, 42 312 
 313 
The intervention has already been used successfully in Australia, Ireland, and Canada, and 314 
France is planning to follow suit.11-15 The countries that are implementing the intervention are 315 
fairly similarly culturally, they are all Western Educated Industrialized Rich Democracies 316 
(WEIRD).43 It is possible that the effect of descriptive norms and therefore the international 317 
applicability of the intervention might vary between cultures. The strength of social norms in 318 
countries is thought to vary along a spectrum that ranges from ‘tight’ (have many strong 319 
norms and a low tolerance of deviant behaviour) to ‘loose’ (have weak social norms and a 320 
high tolerance of deviant behaviour), and the UK, Australia, and France are in the middle of 321 
the spectrum.44, 45 We might anticipate that the feedback letter intervention would be least 322 
effective in the countries with the loosest cultures (Estonia, Hungary, and Ukraine) and most 323 
effective in countries with the tightest cultures (India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, and 324 
South Korea). However, this is very speculative because the way that primary care is 325 
delivered, and that antibiotic prescribing occurs, may differ in these countries and because the 326 
UK has lower antibiotic prescribing than many countries.46 327 
 328 
Our study has several limitations. First, the STAR-PU data is calculated on a quarterly rather 329 
than a monthly basis. Therefore, it is not currently possible to detect the exact extent of the 330 
discontinuity in a specific month of an intervention. The strength of the intervention may 331 
differ over the course of the outcome, but this may be masked by the three-month average of 332 
the outcome variable. Thus, we can conclude that there was a difference in prescribing over 333 
the entire evaluation period, but we are not able to detect time trends, if they exist. Future 334 
studies, conditional on fine-grained longitudinal data, could utilise ITS to address that. 335 
 336 
Second, the RDD tends to be less precise than a comparable RCT. An RDD sample has to be 337 
at least 2.4 times greater than that of an equivalent randomised trial in order to achieve the 338 
same level of precision.24 Moreover, the precision of an RDD is sensitive to the distribution 339 
of scores around the threshold. The non-parametric method of calculating the bandwidth uses 340 
observations close to the threshold.27 Therefore, although our data-driven bandwidth choice is 341 
claimed to be optimal, it ignores the observations outside of the bandwidth. This is why non-342 
parametric methods tend to be less precise than parametric methods for a given sample.24 In 343 
the present study, we accounted for this by looking at the estimates of different RDD models 344 
given different bandwidths. 345 
 346 
In conclusion, our results suggest that it could be worthwhile for antimicrobial stewardship 347 
programmes to incorporate regular social-norm feedback into their activities, as a part of their 348 
strategy. We found that, on average feedback was effective, but it was not effective for the 349 
top 10% of prescribing practices, and future research could investigate why. Individual-level 350 
feedback is likely to be even more effective, but data by prescriber are not yet centrally 351 
available in England. The effectiveness of social-feedback may also generalize to other 352 
domains, including antibiotic prescribing that occurs outside of primary care and other areas 353 
of medicine where evidence suggests that there may be high levels of inappropriate 354 
prescribing or over-use of clinical tests. 355 
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Table 1. Key differences between the six letter variants 513 
  
Previous letter 
Paragraph 2 starts: 
I have written to your 
practice previously and… 
No previous letter 
Top 20%, prescribing not increasing 
Header: 
Your practice is amongst the 20% highest prescribers of 
antibiotics nationally 
Between Paragraph 1 and Paragraph 2: 
The great majority (80%) of practices in England prescribe 
fewer antibiotics per head than yours. Most other practices 
have reduced their prescribing rates since 2013/14 but 
yours has increased. 
 
1A (Figure S1) 1B (Figure S2) 
Top 20%, prescribing increasing 
Header: 
Your practice is amongst the 20% highest prescribers of 
antibiotics nationally 
Between Paragraph 1 and Paragraph 2: 
The great majority (80%) of practices in England prescribe 
fewer antibiotics per head than yours. 
 
2A (Figure S3) 2B (Figure S4) 
Top 10% 
Header: 
Your practice is amongst the 10% highest prescribers of 
antibiotics nationally 
Between Paragraph 1 and Paragraph 2: 
The great majority (90%) of practices in England prescribe 
fewer antibiotics per head than yours. 
 








Table 2. Difference in prescribing rates between treatment and control 521 








in Dispensed Items 






bandwidth 0.262 4294 
-0.015  






bandwidth 1.047 6991 
-0.014  




[-62984, - 152720] 







P-value       
  
LATE* 2185 3 6520 <0.001         
Half- 
bandwidth 461 3 4290 <0.001         
Double- 
bandwidth 4205 3 6987 <0.001         






Figure 1. Discontinuity based on the most parsimonious model 527 
528 
Note. The solid vertical black line represents the discontinuity threshold between the practices that received the 529 
letter (right side of the line), versus the practices that did not (left side of the line). The two dotted lines 530 
represent the LATE bandwidth thresholds. The solid black regression line represents the point-based estimates 531 
of the RDD, whereas the two broken lines on either side of it represent 95% confidence intervals. Only 22 GP 532 
practices in the 10% of highest prescribers were outside of the optimal bandwidth thresholds, indicating that the 533 
bandwidth thresholds are unlikely to be the reason as to why the effects of the intervention were not detected 534 
among these practices. 535 
Table 3. Deprivation adjusted difference in prescribing rates between treatment and control 536 








in Dispensed Items 






bandwidth 0.151 2546 
-0.016  






bandwidth 0.604 6744 
-0.015  












P-value       
  
LATE* 530.6 4 4809 <0.001         
Half- 
bandwidth 69.76 4 2541 <0.001         
Double- 
bandwidth 2107.79 4 6739 <0.001         
* LATE = Local Average Treatment Effect and represents the optimal bandwidth. Adjusted estimates are altered 
by the inclusion of a deprivation covariate (IMD-2015-based measure of population weighted average of the 
Lower Layer Super Output Areas covered by each practice).30 
 537 
 538 
Table 4. Deprivation adjusted difference in prescribing rates between treatment and control by letter 539 
Letter 








z-value P-value Effect  [95% CIs] 
Predicted Change 
in Dispensed Items 





(n = 127) Adjusted 0.302 4814 
-0.026  





                    





(n = 352) Adjusted 0.302 4814 
-0.019  





                    





(n = 290) Adjusted 0.302 4814 
-0.009  





                    





(n = 289) Adjusted 0.302 4814 
-0.014  





                    





(n = 250) Adjusted 0.302 4814 
-0.007  





                    





(n = 70) Adjusted 0.302 4814 
0.006  





* LATE = Local Average Treatment Effect calculated using the optimal bandwidth for a given RDD. Adjusted estimates are 
altered by the inclusion of a deprivation covariate (IMD-2015-based measure of population weighted average of the Lower 
Layer Super Output Areas covered by each practice).30 n = number of practices that received each letter. 
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